Some argue that political stability is best served through a two-party system. This study refutes this. The author mathematically defines the stability and rigidity of electoral systems comprised of any quantity of electors and parties. In fact, stability is a function of the quantity of electors -i.e., the number of occupied seats at the table. As the number of electors increases, the properties of an electorate are increasingly well resolved, and well described by those of an electorate that is least excessive -that is to say an electorate that is closest to equilibrium. Further, electoral rigidity is a function of the quantity of parties and their probabilities of representation. An absolutely rigid system admits no fluctuations -whatever happens to one elector will happen to all electors. As the quantity of parties increases so does the number of party lines, and with it the quantity of alternatives with which to respond to an external stimulus. Rigidity is significant in a social system that places high value on party loyalty. In conclusion, (i) electoral stability is best served by increasing the quantity of electors; (ii) electoral rigidity is best served by decreasing the quantity of parties, and by increasing the representation of some parties at the expense of others; and (iii) the less stable a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those who would hold those offices for the people.
Introduction
employ directionality in a qualitative manner to describe the electorate, whereas herein the author uses vectors, which include both magnitude and direction, to study the electorate in a quantitative manner.
The problem addressed here is to understand how the stability and rigidity of an electoral system vary with the quantity of electors, N, and parties, M. The philosophical approach (Section 2) is to adhere to the law of parsimony by utilizing an isotropic preference structure.
The technical approach (Section 3) is to understand multi-party electoral systems by utilizing multinomial properties and both magnitudal and directional ensemble averages. The results (Section 4) are explained qualitatively by using two visual aids (Figures 2 and 3) , and quantitatively by writing closed-form analytic expressions for the stability (Equation 19 ) and rigidity (Equation 20 ) of electoral systems. Results indicate that (i) beginning with absolute instability for a single-elector system, the stability increases monotonically to unity as the quantity of electors, N, increases; and (ii) beginning with absolute rigidity for a one-party system, the rigidity decreases monotonically to null as the quantity of parties, M, increases. The discussion (Section 5) focuses on asking and answering the following question: how does this theory of electoral dynamics enhance the understanding of a real electoral systems. This discussion makes use of the constitutional order of the United States of America as an archetype. Each branch of government is analyzed individually and then they are analyzed together comparatively. Finally, the author draws three conclusions (Section 6): (1) electoral stability is best served by increasing the quantity of electors; (2) electoral rigidity is best served by decreasing the quantity of parties, and decreasing their proportional representation; and (3) the less stable a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those who would hold those offices for the people. There are two appendices. Each provides a necessary mathematical proof.
Philosophical Approach
The author's approach is grounded in the canon of philosophical thought. Throughout this study of electoral dynamics the author adheres to Ockham's law of parsimony: "explain[ing] by the assumption of fewer things [15] ," while adequately representing the most salient properties. As a consequence, the author utilizes an isotropic preference structure -the underlying preference is uniformly likely to be in any direction -and measures the properties of the entire ensemble of permissible preference structures. A description of any one structure is foregone in favor of a gross description of all structures simultaneously.
This approach is idealistic and realistic. Conventional wisdom dictates that "politics makes strange bedfellows [16] ." Thus, no matter how seemingly unlikely an electoral alliance may appear, even the least preferable alliance may not be ignored or discounted. Further, we empirically know that there are numerous ways for Party A and Party B to be oriented. At any given time, Party A and Party B may be in agreement (parallel orientation) and be either in favor of or against electoral issue i; they may be in disagreement and be in opposition (anti-parallel orientation) on electoral issue j; either party may be in favor of or against electoral issue k while the other party is ambivalent [17, 18] on the issue (perpendicular orientation); or, they may both be ambivalent to electoral issue l, but for different reasons (co-planar orientation).
Technical Approach
The technical approach is to expand from an understanding of a binary system [19] , whose states are described with a binomial expansion, to an understanding of a multi-party system, whose states are described by a multinomial expansion. The author begins by specifying the model that is used to represent electoral systems (Section 3.1). The author continues by writing the generating function, which yields the probability of each and every vote by an electorate (Sec-tion 3.2). Then, the author defines the primary vectors that will be used throughout this study; chief among them are the electoral vector and the equilibrium-electoral vector (Section 3.3).
The author then briefly uses number theory to explain that each and every vote taken by an electorate is a permutation of the partitions of a positive integer N into M (Section 3.4). The author explains the relationship between the multiplicity of each vote configuration and the probability-density function of a multinomially distributed variable (Section 3.5). Next, the author explains that a quantitative understanding of an electoral dynamics necessitates the use of two ensemble averages: a magnitudal and a directional average (Section 3.6). The author then uses vector algebra to define the fractional fluctuation, which a relative measure of the expected deviation of a system from its equilibrium (Section 3.7). The author explains that the fractional fluctuation is separable, and may be written as the product of the volatility, which is solely a function of the quantity of electors, and the flexibility, which is solely a function of the quantity of parties; and that the stability and rigidity are the unitary complements of the volatility and flexibility, respectively (Section 3.8). Two assist the reader in comprehending this material, the author provides an example electoral system in Figure 1 , several examples of integer partitions of N into M in Table 1 , and a thorough example of how to calculate an ensemble average in Table 2 .
Specification of the Model
The author enumerates this theory with eleven statements, all of which are given below a. There is a positive integer number, N, of seat of power in the system.
b. An elector occupies each and every seats of power.
c. There is a fixed integer M of possible outcomes.
d. The direction of the k th possible outcome points in the direction of unit vectork.
e. Each elector must align with one and only one outcome.
f. The event probabilities of the outcomes are p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p M ,
g. An elector aligned with the k th outcome will have an electoral momentm k .
h. Each permutation of the electoral marks is electorally allowed.
i. Each orientation of the electoral moments is electorally allowed.
j. The directional probabilities of orientation are uniformly distributed over all orientations.
k. The direction of the electoral momentm k is isotropic for k = 1, 2, . . . , M.
Example Electoral System
An example of the model electoral system is illustrated in Figure 1 . There the reader finds five seats of power, each occupied with an elector whose single arrow points is aligned with one of four distinct parties. The state of the example system is such that there is one elector aligned with party 1, one elector aligned with party 2, two electors aligned with party three, and one elector aligned with party 4.
Generating Function
Each and every permutation of a vote by an electorate is generated by the symbolic product of N factors as
Each factor represents an elector that is directed in exactly one of some fixed finite number M possible directions,1,2, . . .M , with probabilities p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p M . Consistent with electoral reality, these probabilities are bounded as 0 ≤ p i ≤ 1 and constrained as 
Vector Definitions
Each state of the system has a correspondence with an electoral-excess vector, N , that describes it as
where N k is the number of electors aligned with the k th party. Additionally, each system has an equilibrium-electoral vector that is given as
From these two, the author defines the electoral-excess vector as
The last vector to be defined is the one vector,1. It is given as a linear combination of the directions of all the outcomes as
The reader recalls thatk is the orientation of the k th party, and p k is the event probability of outcome k.
Vote Configurations
Irrespective of each elector's underlying preference, the result of a vote is always a partition [20, 21] of N into exactly M parts 3 . In Table 1 , the author presents five complete set of partitions; one each for five distinct electoral systems. In all cases, N = 5, and M = 1, 2, . . . 5,
respectively. The cardinality, c(N, M), of each set, C(N, M), is written on the last row of the table.
Multiplicity Function
Multiplicity functions are central to this study. The multiplicity function, g N gives the number of occurrences of the electoral vector N . Within a constant of proportionality, the multi- 3 The theory here can be exteneded to allow for abstention or non-participation. For example, allow that from the N seats of power that N A electors abstain. Including for this eventuality, the system has one additional outcome. Thus by taking into account absentions, a vote is always a partition of N into exactly M + 1 parts. Table 1 : Example of partitions of N into M. Irrespective of each elector's preferential marks, the vote must tally to a partition of N into M. The cardinality, c(N, M), of each set of partitions, C(N, M), is given on the bottom-most row.
plicities are given by the probability-mass function of the multinomial distribution as
Through graphic presentations of the multiplicity functions (see Figures 2 and 3 ), the reader may respectively obtain a complete qualitative and quantitative understanding of how the stability and rigidity of electoral systems vary with respect to the quantity of electors and parties, respectively.
In Table 2 the author includes relevant information regarding an electoral system with 
In the above equation, m(n) is the multiplicity of integer n -i.e., the number of instances of n in the multiset associated with vectorN . In column 2, the author writes the multiplicity, g N , of each permutation. The sum of multiplicities, g N , correctly totals to M N .
Before continuing to the next section the reader will please note that each variable N k (k = This quotient is equal to the probability-density function of a binomially distribution variable with event probability p 1 = 0.1 that is evaluated at N 1 = 1. Note that the probability-density function, P , of a binomially distributed variable, N k , evaluated at an integer value n is
Thus, the author utilizes the binomial distribution to qualitatively describe the stability and rigidity of electoral systems (see the comments in Section 4.1 regarding Figures 2 and 3 ).
Ensemble Averages
A complete quantitative understanding of the stability and rigidity of electoral systems requires the use of ensemble averages. In this paper, the author utilizes two distinct ensemble averages of a function f : a magnitudal average, f , and a directional average, {f }.
Directional Ensemble Average
The directional ensemble average is given as 
To calculate the expected value of a dynamic variable, each and every electoral state must be included (column 1). For each state, the multiplicity (column 2) and the dynamic variable (column 3) are calculated From these, a weighted sum is computed (column 4). Finally, the weighted sum is divided by the total number of states. For an electoral system with five electors (N = 5) and three parties (M = 3), the expected value of the systems variance is 656.1/ 243 Table 2 the author provides a directional ensemble average for each permutation of each partition. Specifically, the author gives the directional ensemble average of the dot product of the excess vector with itself, where the electoral-excess vector is equal to the difference between the electoral vector and the equilibrium-electoral vector.
Magnitudal Ensemble Average
The magnitudal ensemble average is given as
In the above equation, C(M, N) is the set of each and every permutations of each and every partition of N into M parts (see Section 3.5). In column 4 of Table 2 the author provides the product of the multiplicity and the directional ensemble average of the dot product of the electoral-excess with itself. Thus, looking at the very last row of the table, the reader observes that its magnitudal ensemble average is 656.1/243 = 2.7.
Fractional Fluctuation
The fractional fluctuation is a relative measurement of the expected deviation from equilibrium of a system. The present author gives the fractional fluctuation as the square root of the expected value of the inner product of the excess vector with itself, which is then normalized. It is 4 Most generally speaking, there is one-dimension for each of the fixed integer M possible outcomes. In the special case of party dynamics, the fact that two or more parties may agree on one issue does not lower the dimensionality of the system in the broader context. De facto, each party has its own unique genesis and thus, in broad terms, augments the dimensionality of an electoral system. mathematically defined in terms of the electoral vector, N , the equilibrium-electoral vector, N o , and the one vector, 1, as
This form above is suggestive of the coefficient of variation (i.e., the square root of the variance over the mean). Before continuing to explain how the fractional fluctuation is used to construct the four dynamic variables of interest, the author notes that the literature is without consensus on how to write the coefficient of variation for a multivariate distribution [22, 23] .
Volatility, Flexibility, Stability, and Rigidity
The technical approach is to write the fractional fluctuation in a separable form as
where the volatility, V, is solely a function of quantity of electors and the the flexibility, L, is a function of the quantity of parties (and their probability of representation [see Section 4.2]).
The fractional fluctuation is proportional to both the volatility an the flexibility of the system.
Meanwhile, the stability, S, and rigidity, R, of a system's properties are defined as the unitary complements of the volatility and fluidity, respectively, as
Now that the technical approach is clarified, the author presents the results.
Results
In this section, the author presents two major results: the stability and the rigidity of the properties of electoral systems. The author presents a qualitative and quantitative explanation for both of these dynamic attributes. The author begins with a qualitative description that may be gleaned through visual examination of the probability-density functions of the multinomially distributed random variables (Section 4.1). The author ends with a quantitative description that is given by closed-form analytic expressions (Section 4.2).
Qualitative Results
To illustrate the stability of electoral systems the author presents data for four distinct electoral systems in Figure 2 . In Panes 
Stability
Just as in the binary system [19] , the stability of the system's properties increases as the multinomial distribution becomes more resolved and more steeply varying away from the peaks that are located at equilibrium. Figure 2 variance indicates a system whose properties have greater stability. Therefore, the properties of the electoral system become increasingly stable because the system is increasingly likely to be found closer and closer to equilibrium.
Resolution: In

Rigidity
The author's understanding of rigidity conforms to the normative usage 5 . Before continuing, the reader is encouraged to bare in mind that the qualitative discussion herein applies specifically to the maximum-entropy, special case where p k = 1/M for each of the k outcomes. A more general and thorough description of the rigidity of electoral systems is offered analytically in the quantitative results of Section 4.2.
M = 1; Absolute Rigidity: In exactly the same way that Wolin writes that political rigidity is the absence of alternatives [25] , the reader observes in Pane (a) of Figure 3 that there is one and only one value of N k with a non-zero probability density, namely the value at equilibrium 
Each of these additional alternatives presents additional modalities with which to respond to an electoral force.
Limit as M Approaches Infinity:
In Pane (d) of Figure 3 , the author plots the probabilitydensity function of the random variable N k for a very large quantity of outcomes M = 500.
The reader notes that in the limit as the quantity of outcomes approaches infinity, the probability distribution increasingly appears as a reflected copy of the probability-density function for the one-party system in Pane (a) of Figure 3 . Indeed, as M approaches infinity, p k goes towards
1/M and the variance of the binomially distributed variable goes as
. Thus just like in Pane (a), as M approaches infinity the variance of the random variable N k yields zero variability. However, as opposed to a one-party system there are now M such binomially distributed random variables in the system. Consequently the total variance of the multinomially distributed electoral system asymptotically approaches N (i.e., 
Quantitative Results
The 
Volatility, Flexibility, Stability, and Rigidity
In Appendix A the author derives the following expression for the fractional fluctuation.
Comparing the result above with the separable form of the fractional fluctuation that is given in Equation 13 , the volatility, V(N), and flexibility, L(M), of the electoral system are respectively revealed by the following closed-form analytic expressions:
Next, comparing the results above with the definitions in Equations 14 and 15, the stability, S(N), and rigidity, R(M), of the electoral system are respectively revealed by the following closed-form analytic expressions:
As explained in the technical approach (see Section3.8), the volatility and stability of the system's properties are solely dependent on the quantity of electors while flexibility and rigidity of the system's properties are dependent on the quantity of parties (and each party's probability of representation).
Extremal Values
Beginning with absolute instability (i.e., S(1) = 0) for a single-elector system, the stability increases monotonically to unity in the limit as the quantity of electors approaches infinity (i.e.,
In Appendix B, the author shows that for a fixed integer M of possible outcomes the flexibility is bounded as
The flexibility has a maximum when each of the M of possible outcomes is equally probable, and has a minimum when any one of the possible outcomes is one-hundred percent probable.
The rigidity is thus bounded as
The rigidity has a maximum when any one of the possible outcomes is one-hundred percent probable, and has a minimum when each of the M possible outcomes is equally probable. The properties of an electoral system with one possible outcome are absolutely rigid. As the quantity of possible outcomes increases and the respective probabilities of each outcome are increasingly proporional, then the properties of the electoral system become less rigid and more flexible.
Discussion
Until now the author offers mathematical notions of electoral dynamics. As a counterpoint, the author now discusses how this theory is relevant to realpolitik. The author asks and answers the following question: how does the theory of electoral stability and rigidity enhance our understanding of the constituional order of the United States of America, which has multiple branches of government? An individual analysis of each of three branches of government is presented in Section 5.1. A comparitive analysis of three branches of government is presented in Section 5.2. A tabular summary is given in Table 3 . 
Individual Analysis
An individual analysis of the executive branch, the judicial branch, and the legislative branch is given in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3, respectively. The stability and rigidity of each branch is sequentially described. Each attribute is bounded from below and bounded from above.
Executive Branch
The executive branch of government is comprised of the federal offices of the President and the Vice President. If the executive branch only included the president, then the executive branch would be a single-elector system and thus absolutely unstable (i.e., S(1) = 0). Because the founding fathers incorporated a line of succession 6 that includes the federal office of the Vice President, the executive branch is stabilized -at least to some extent. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the stability of the executive branch, S E , is bounded as
When deliberating any choice, the President may seek extensive council and demand multiple options from advisors and administrators. Ultimately the buck passing stops with the President who is solely responsible to reduce the quantity of choices and select an outcome.
Each choice made by the President is circumstantial. At any time, there may be a myriad of choices under deliberation. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the rigidity of the executive branch, R E , is bounded as R(∞) ≤ R E ≤ R(1).
Judicial Branch
The judicial branch of government is comprised of the federal offices of the Justices of the Supreme Court. Every decision is made by a majority vote; however, justices may recuse themselves from participation in any official action. That said, six members of the court constitute a quorum. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the stability of the judicial branch, S J , is bounded as S(6) ≤ S J ≤ S(9). In theory, lady justice is blind and so non-partisan. The justices, in their robes may be considered either indistinguishable from each other or disitinguishable (i.e., independent judicial review). Subsequently, there are often unanimous decision and there are also often more than one dissenting opinion. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the rigidity of the judical branch, R J , is bounded as R(9) ≤ R J ≤ R(1).
Legislative Branch
The legislative branch of government is bicameral; it is composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The quantity of electors in these branches are 101 and 430, respectively.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution requires that a quorum to conduct official Senate business is the smallest integer larger than half the quantity of electors (i.e. 51). Whereas given by the clerk of the House of Representatives, "when there are no vacancies in the membership, a quorum is 218. 7 ." In consideration of these facts, the author states that the stability of the Senate, S S , and the House of Representatives, S R , are bounded as S(51) ≤ S S ≤ S(101) and
With respect to rigidity, while party cohesion is certainly factored into their choices, each member of congress is also tied to the parochial interests of their local constituency, as well as the political patronage from within and without their respective constituency. Therefore, as in the judical branch, the author states that the rigidity of each camera is bounded from below by their respecive quantity of members (i.e., R(M = N)); and is bounded from above by the possibility of the electors acting in unison with consensus (i.e., R(M = 1)). In consideration of the above, author states that the rigidity of the Senate, R S , and the House of Representatives, R R , are bounded as R(101) ≤ R S ≤ R(1) and R(430) ≤ R R ≤ R(1), respectively.
Comparative Analysis
The summary of individual analyses of each branch of government is given in Table 3 . The data is consistent with the experience of the everyday lay political observer and the astute specialist.
The author finds that resulting from the inherent instability of the executive branch it is no wonder that the election of the President/Vice President is the most watched and the most contested stability of a nine-seat jury opining on issues fundamently relevent to 300 million people that the justices be thoroughly vetted and even subject to a super-majority vote. To first-order approximation, among the bicameral legislative branches, the observer notes that the Senate, with its lesser quantity of electors and concomitant greater instability, is the more valued legislative prize for the parties that comprise the political order; and that the House of Representative, with its greater quantity of electors and greater stability, provides the highest fidelity representation of the people.
Conclusions
Given that the number of electors is at most 8 billion () we may not safely presume that the most probably configuration is the only configuration is the only significant configuration for electoral systems.
This manuscript is inspired by the Supreme Court's majority opinion on Timmons versus the Twin-Cities Area New Party. The author draws on techniques well known in statistical mechanics to refute the majority opinion of the court. In conclusion, (i) electoral stability and electoral rigidity are best served by increasing the quantity of electors, (ii) electoral rigidity is best served by decreasing the quantity of parties and reducing their proportional representation, and (iii) the less stable a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those who would hold those offices for the people.
angles subtended between them. The derivation of the former is rather straitforward and depends on known properties of the multinomial distribution. The derivation of the latter is rather more involved; and so while the result is given below, the interested reader may view the entire derivation in Section A.2. The author finds that
In spherical coordinates,l corresponds to the unit vector with r = 1, and φ 1 , . . . φ M −1 are all arbitrary. So, in light of Equations 38 and 40, the dot productk ·l = cos (φ 1 ). The expected value k ·l is given as
Next, comparing Equations 36 and 41; and bearing in mind that 
B Proof of Equation 21: The Bounds of Flexibility
From Equation20, the flexibility is.
The extremal values of L occurs at the endpoint(s) and/or when the gradient of L, ∇L, is equal to zero. Here, the author compares the values of the flexibility at the end point and the zerogradient point and determines the minimum and maximum values of the flexibility.
The end point(s) occurs when p j = 1 and p k = 0 for all k ∈ 1, . . . , M and k = j . The value of the flexibility at the endpoint(s), L| e.p. , is L| e.p. = √ 1 − 1 = 0.
Meanwhile, the gradient is generally given [26] by
